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This paper attempts to identify moral hazard in the traditional reinsurance market. We build a
multi-period principle agent model of the reinsurance transaction from which we derive predictions on
premium design, monitoring, loss control and insurer risk retention. We then use panel data on U.S.
property liability reinsurance to test the model. The empirical results are consistent with the model’s
predictions. In particular, we find evidence for the use of loss sensitive premiums when the insurer and
reinsurer are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same financial group), but little or no use of monitoring.
In contrast, we find evidence for the use of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates, where
monitoring costs are lower, but little use of price controls.
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I. Introduction
Insurance companies whose book of business is exposed to high risk, such as hurricane or
earthquake losses or class action product liability lawsuits, have traditionally hedged the right tail
of this exposure through reinsurance.  Like primary insurance, reinsurance contracts encounter moral
hazard. It is costly for the reinsurer to monitor the underwriting activities of the primary insurer and
how the latter  settles claims with its own policyholders. Consequently, reinsurance relaxes incentive
for the primary to engage in careful underwriting and loss mitigation activities. This problem can be
especially severe after a natural catastrophe where the primary insurer is overwhelmed with flood
or earthquake claims, and is able to pass on the cost of settlements to the reinsurer. 
Traditional reinsurance includes price controls against moral hazard, including deductibles,
copayments, and “ex-post settling up” which is a retrospective adjustment of the premium based on
losses incurred during the policy period, known as “retrospective rating.”  Less formal and longer-
term controls are also in place.  Reinsurance is usually conducted as a long-term relationship.
Experience bonds parties together and increases the cost of opportunistic behavior. The primary
insurer gets continuity of access to reinsurance while the reinsurer can use the relationship’s duration
to increase the effectiveness of its monitoring, and can use experience to set future prices and terms.
1
Controlling moral hazard via long-term relationships can be costly.  Froot and O’Connell
(1997) have documented the costs of catastrophe reinsurance and show that the ratio of premium to
expected loss increases dramatically at higher layers of coverage (i.e. for reinsurance in the right
hand tail of the loss distribution). Since moral hazard will increase in intensity the greater the level
of reinsurance, this pricing pattern is quite consistent with moral hazard. Moreover, the shear size2 Another explanation for Froot and O’Connell’s result is that, since the tail is thin, the coefficient of variation
for high levels of coverage is high and therefore reinsurers are extracting an appropriate risk premium. But this
explanation does not fit well with the portfolio theory. If this risk is of low beta as they show, then why the risk premium?
To support this explanation, one would need to show, not that the coefficient of variation was high for high layers
contracts, but that such contracts greatly increased the portfolio risk of the reinsurer.
3 Until the late 1980s, insured catastrophic losses were typically not very large.  The only category five hurricane
to hit the United States in the 20th century was hurricane Camille in August, 1969.  It scored a 6.3 “PCS Index Settlement
Value” as calculated by the Chicago Board of Trade (1995) where Property Claim Services cat options began trading
in 1994.  This index corresponds to $630 million in insured losses in 1994 dollars.  The actual insured losses were even
less than this amount but the CBOT, in creating a simulated index value for historical losses, adjusted the number upward
for population growth between 1969 and 1994.  In sharp contrast, hurricane Andrew of August 1992, scored a significant
173.2, or $17.32 billion in 1994 dollars.  Earthquake losses in previous years have also increased as more residential and
commercial development takes place in higher-risk land as the population size grows.
4See Bond and Crocker (1997) and Crocker and Morgan (1998) for insurance models. 
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of these premium loading suggests that addressing moral hazard in this way is expensive.
2  These
large premium loads are relevant today as both insured property and claims have increased
significantly the past few decades.
3
Monitoring can also redress moral hazard.
4  Williamson (1985) argued that, whereas markets
use price incentives to resolve agency conflicts between separate organizations, monitoring can be
a more efficient way to resolve conflicts within organizations where there is greater access to
information.  This idea has been developed into models of vertical integration by Riordan (1990a,b)
and Cremer (1993, 1995).  These papers show that for transactions within firms, where monitoring
is relatively cheap, more emphasis should be placed on monitoring and less on contractual
incentives. The opposite is true for transactions between firms where monitoring costs are higher.
In the last few years, insurers have begun to use new hedge instruments in which tail risk is
transferred directly to investors. These instruments, known as “insurance-linked securities,” include
catastrophe bonds, cat options and cat equity puts. The normal rationale for securitizing this risk,
instead of transferring it with reinsurance, is that very large losses can be absorbed much easier in
a multi-trillion dollar capital market than in a multi-billion dollar insurance market, especially as5 Chicago Board of Trade (1995, Chapter 6).
6 For example, in a recent bond issued on behalf of the Tokyo Fire and Marine Insurance company, the payout
is related to the intensity and location of an earthquake.  Sometimes “modeled” triggers are used as well which base the
payout on the output of a simulation model which uses parametric inputs.
7 To be sure, since any one firm’s losses are less than perfectly correlated with the index, the insurer that
purchases the security now faces some “basis risk” in exchange for less moral hazard inefficiency.  However, the basis
risk goes to zero as the insurer’s portfolio mix of losses approaches that of the market, or, in the case of parametric
triggers, if historic correlations between losses and parameters continue to hold.  Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips (1999)
demonstrates that the basis risk is typically very small empirically.  Doherty (2000) analytically derives a firm’s basis
risk as a function of its portfolio composition and market share.
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these risks tend not to be highly correlated with market returns (low beta).
5  
But another explanation for securitizing insurance risk is that is has introduced new controls
for moral hazard.  Whereas reinsurance is normally an indemnity-based contract tied to the primary
insurer’s specific losses, the payoff of insurance-linked securities are typically tied to an index or
parameter that is outside of the primary insurer’s direct control, thus reducing moral hazard.  For
example, an “index trigger” cat security, such as cat options traded on the CBOT and cat bonds, link
the payout to an index of aggregate losses across many insurers.  “Parametric triggers” securities link
a payout to a physical description of disaster (e.g., intensity of the earthquake).
6  Both of these trigger
mechanisms are, in effect, “instrument variables” for the insurer’s losses since they are intended to
be highly correlated with the insurer’s losses but are outside the insurer’s control.
7
This paper focuses on the moral hazard in the reinsurance market which we believe might
help to explain the emergence of securitized insurance instruments.  The idea that insurance – and,
by extension, reinsurance – might lead to moral hazard is, of course, not new.  This paper, however,
provides empirical evidence of moral hazard in the reinsurance market.  We test to see if reinsurers
control for moral hazard either by using loss sensitive future premiums and/or by monitoring.
We not only find evidence for moral hazard in the reinsurance market, we also find that the
methods that reinsurers use to address moral hazard across types of business relationships are8 Co-insurance, where only a fraction of the loss is indemnified, is equivalent to retrospective rating.
9 See Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992), Tufano (1996) and Doherty (2000).
-4-
consistent with the principal-agent model.   In particular, we find strong evidence for the use of loss
sensitive premiums when the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same
financial group) but little or no use of monitoring.  In contrast, we find strong evidence for the use
of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates but little use of price controls.  Since
monitoring is relatively cheap among affiliates, the model predicts that monitoring is more likely to
be used when the contracting parties are related.
Section II develops our model.  Section III  derives an estimating equation from the model
and tests it on a panel data set we have put together by combining Best’s and National Association
of Insurance Commissioners data.  Section IV concludes.
II. A Principal Agent Model of Reinsurance
We develop a two-period principle-agent model with three risk-sharing mechanisms: a
deductible, retrospective rating and experience rating.
8  Retrospective rating adjusts the insurance
premium that is paid over one period for losses in the same period.  Experience rating adjusts
premiums based on losses in previous periods.  We also include monitoring. With costless
monitoring, the first-best solution could be attained.  But, in reality, monitoring is presumably more
costly between non-affiliates than between affiliates.
The existence of reinsurance requires that even a publically-held primary insurer is averse
to risk in its loss portfolio.  An large literature shows how the value of a firm is affected by the
riskiness of its cash flows. More risk raises the costs of financial distress, enhances agency problems
between the main stakeholders and can lead to under-investment in new projects when external
capital is costly.
9 Since these costs increase with risk, the firm’s value function is concave, as shown-5-
by Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990.
Moreover, reinsurance can be efficient only if the cost of risk bearing to the reinsurer is less
than cost to the primary insurer, a condition that can be met if the reinsurer is more diversified. For
example, insurance of natural catastrophes is often undertaken by regional or national primary
insurers and reinsured by national or international reinsurance firms.  Since correlations between
catastrophes in different parts of the world are low, the reinsurer can provide coverage to primaries
operating in many different locations.  Reinsurance exploits comparative advantage in diversification
by re-assigning risk between parties for whom the costs of bearing risk differ (Borch, 1962).  This
transaction can be captured with a risk-averse primary insurer and a risk-neutral reinsurer, an
approach taken in most modern reinsurance models. In the next sub section, we present a standard
principal agent model. However, while the basic model is unoriginal (and we do not go through
complete proofs), we have added detail on the types of moral hazard controls in order to draw out
the empirical predictions.
The Primary (Ceding) Insurer’s Problem
The primary insurer in period t, t 0 {1,2}, has a value Wt, given its direct insurance portfolio.
Wt does not reflect any reinsurance transactions or any actions taken to control aggregate loss claims.
In period t, the primary insurer chooses action at that affects the probability distribution over its
aggregate losses, Lt.  Action at can be a property inspection, offering financial incentives to
policyholders to mitigate risk, or a more economical settlement of claims.  The mean of Lt is
decreasing in at.  The choice of at also generates a signal m that is imperfectly correlated with a, but
still conveys valuable information to the reinsurer.  The primary insurer pays a premium Pt to the
reinsurer for a reinsurance contract that is subject to a deductible (or “stop loss”) of St. Under this
contract, the reinsurer compensates the primary insurer in period t for max[0, Lt - St].  Let  f (m, L |-6-
a) be the joint probability density of event {m, L}, conditional on a.
The first-year reinsurance premium is a function of the loss during this period (retrospective
rating), the deductible and the signal:  .  The second-year premium depends on ()( ) PP L S m 11 1 1 1 ⋅= ,,
the second-year coverage signal and loss but also depends on losses during the first year (experience
rating):   . ( )( ) PP L L S m 22 1 2 2 2 ⋅= ,,,
In any period t, the primary’s wealth is Wt - Pt - Lt if the loss, Lt, is below the deductible, St,
and  Wt - Pt - St if Lt exceeds St.  Assuming a zero risk-free rate to reduce notation, the primary
(ceding) insurer’s expected utility is,
(1)
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The primary insurer picks the level of effort in the first period, a1, and the policy function for the
level of effort in the second period,  , to maximize its expected utility, C.  Representing the ( ) aL 21
primary insurer’s problem in equation (1) as a concave programming problem reflects the
assumption of risk aversion, discussed above, that motivates the presence of reinsurance.
The Re-Insurer’s Problem
The reinsurer incurs a monitoring cost of c and we assume that organizational features makes
this cost fixed per reinsurance contract but different between firms.  In particular, c is high for-7-
reinsurance transactions between unrelated insurers and low for reinsurance between members of
the same corporate family (see Williamson 1985, Riordan 1990a,b, and Cremer 1993, 1995).  This
discrete structure highlights the dichotomous effects of organization structure on contract design.
The reinsurer picks premium functions in years 1 and 2, P1(@) and P2(@), to maximize total
profit.  The reinsurer’s contract income, written in period t, is the difference between premiums, Pt,
and losses, Lt, in excess of the deductible St, less monitoring costs in period t (t = 1,2):
(2)
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(3) C C ≥ 
(4) MC/Ma1 = 0
(5) MC/Ma2 = 0
where   is the primary insurer’s “reservation” expected utility that they would have without  C
reinsurance.  Equation (3) is the “participation” constraint that ensures that the reinsurance contract,10 The regularity conditions required to directly use the first-order conditions of the incentive compatibility
constraint are discussed in Jewitt (1988).
11 The independence assumption is standard in the literature and is not restrictive.  Recall that the premium paid
in any period is already a function of the loss, L, in that period and previous periods.  Hence, the value of the second
signal, m, arises from its ability to convey additional information about the action a that is not already revealed by L.
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{P1(@), P2(@), S1, S2}, is purchased by the primary insurer.  Equations (4) and (5) are the “incentive
compatibility constraints” that ensures that the hidden actions, at, maximizes the primary insurer’s
expected utility.
10
To solve the system of equations (2) - (5), it is quite natural to make use of the special case
of Holmstrom (1979) in which the monitoring signal, m, is independent of the loss L.
11  Thus, the
joint density can be written as  f (m , L*a) = g (m*a) h (L*a).  Let 8, :1 and :2 denote the Lagrangian
multipliers for constraints (3) through (5).  The optimality conditions are obtained using calculus of





where   and   are the derivatives of g(C) and h(C) with respect to the action a. ( ) gm a '| ( ) hL a '|
If the reinsurer monitors, it pays the fixed cost in both periods and receives some information
about the hidden action, a, of the primary insurer ( ; m > 0).  If, however, the reinsurer cc 12 00 >> ;
chooses not to monitor then it does not pay the fixed costs and it does not receive any information
about the action, a, other than information which can be inferred from the loss realization, L, itself
(;   m = 0).  The reinsurer chooses to monitor in each period if its profit is higher than cc 12 0 ==
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reinsurers (i.e., part of the same financial group) will tend to face lower monitoring costs,   and  , c1 c2
and are, therefore, more likely to monitor.  The monitoring costs for non-affiliates will tend to be
higher, resulting in less use of monitoring.
The Premium Structure Implied by the First-Order Conditions
Equations (6) - (9) implicitly define the optimal premium policy functions used by the
reinsurer.  But we need to add some additional minimal structure to derive some testable predictions.
We use of the standard regularity assumption on the likelihood ratios, as in, e.g., Lambert (1984).
Assumption. (i)  is decreasing in  . ( ) ( ) hLa h La '|/ | 11 11 L1









These assumptions imply that the Lagrangian multipliers 8, :1 and :2(L1) are positive; see Lambert.
Equations 6 through 9 reveal a two-tier risk-sharing structure.  In each period, the premium
depends on whether the loss exceeds the deductible (equations 7 and 9) or not (equations 6 and 8).
The model yields predictions on price incentives and the use of monitoring to control moral hazard.-10-
Loss sensitive premiums.  The model predicts that the price of reinsurance is sensitive to
concurrent reinsurance losses and to the prior period’s losses total and reinsured losses. 
Retrospective Rating.  Consider equations 6 and 7 for period one.  If the loss is below the
deductible (equation 6), the premium must be set so that the primary insurer’s marginal utility is
increasing (i.e., wealth decreasing) in L.  Since the primary’s marginal utility depends directly on L
(L is below the deductible), this condition can be satisfied with a constant premium. This is not to
say the premium should be held constant.  Rather, the condition does not require that the premium
be retrospectively adjusted to losses because the reinsurer is not exposed to losses below the
deductible.  More restrictions on g(@) and h(@) are needed to determine if the optimal premium should
be held constant or not.  For losses above the deductible (equation 7), the primary!s marginal utility
must again increase (wealth decrease) with losses. Since the premium is now the only argument of
utility sensitive to losses, the premium must be retrospectively adjusted for losses above the
deductible.
Experience Rating (not interacted with the level of reinsurance purchased).  The second
period premium structure, equations 8 and 9, is more complicated. Similar arguments can be used
to show that second period premiums need not be adjusted to second-period losses below S2; but an
adjustment will occur when losses exceed S2.  But the second-period premium will also depend on
first-period losses (experience rating).  The second period premium is increasing in first-period
losses regardless of whether the first-period and second-period deductibles are pierced. Formally,
note that second-period marginal utility is sensitive to first-period losses and the only argument in
the first-order conditions (8) and (9) which admits this effect is the premium. Thus, experience rating
is accomplished by setting reinsurance premiums with respect to the primary insurer’s total past
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its direct losses, as opposed to it’s reinsured losses. As we will see below, data limitations will
impede our effort to detect experience and retrospective rating directly and we will focus more on
the model’s prediction that price sensitivity is directly related to the level of reinsurance coverage.
Direct Price Control for Moral Hazard.  The model predicts that the responsiveness of
premiums to prior losses increases as more reinsurance is purchased.  Formally, consider equation
(9).  As first-period losses increase, the likelihood ratio h!(L1*a1)/h(L1*a1) falls (Assumption i).  The
marginal utility in the denominator on the left side of equation (9), therefore, must increase and so
the premium must fall.  But notice that the marginal utility also depends on S2. Given diminishing
marginal utility, then the premium responsiveness to larger losses must be higher the lower the level
of S2, i.e., the greater the level of losses passed to the reinsurer. Note that this price control is a direct
function of reinsured losses.
Use of Monitoring.  The premium also can be sensitive to the monitoring signal m.  If the
monitoring cost to the reinsurer (e.g., a non-affiliate) is sufficiently high so that it chooses not to
monitor then, by definition, the “null signal” they observe is unrelated to the primary insurer’s action,
a.  In this case,   = 0 , t = {1,2}, and so the monitoring terms drop out from the first-order ( ) gma tt '|
conditions (6) - (9).
12  The reinsurer will rely exclusively on price incentives to control moral hazard.
This outcome also occurs if the monitoring signal is cheap to acquire but non-informative of the
action, a.
If the cost of the signal is both cheap to acquire (e.g., between affiliates) and informative,
then the first-order conditions show that the use of monitoring will tend to reduce the reliance on
price controls.  In the extreme, if the monitoring signal, m, is perfectly correlated with the hidden
action, a, then the revealed loss cannot reveal additional information about the action a and price13 As in Holmstrom (1979, p. 82), perfect monitoring implies  = 0 œ L, i.e., nothing about the action fL m a '( , | )

























14 To clarify our empirical tests below, our theoretical model includes more structure than is strictly necessary.
In particular, the deductible terms, S1 and S2, replicate the intercept terms of the premium policy functions, P1(@) and
P2(@), respectively.  In the case of full insurance, the optimal intercept terms are zero.
15 These relationships could be immediately formalized by first using the implicit function theorem and then
applying a first-order Taylor expansion to create a linear relationship between the dependent variable (the reinsurance
premium) and all independent variables (direct price controls, experience rating as well as monitoring).
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controls and deductibles will not be used.  Perfect monitoring implies that the terms in equations (6)
- (9), that multiply each : term, must sum to zero, resulting in a common single Lagrangian
multiplier, 8, for each first-order condition.
13  The optimal insurance contact requires S1 = S2 = 0.
14
Intuitively, perfect monitoring alone allows for full reinsurance. 
Summary of the Reduced-Form Model Predictions
To summarize, our model predicts that the reinsurance premium in period t responds as
follows to each of the following independent variables:
15
Direct price control: Negatively related to the inverse of total (direct) losses by the primary insurer
in period t-1. The magnitude of this relationship increases in the share of
reinsured losses in period t.
Retrospective rating: Negatively related to the inverse of amount of reinsured losses  in period t.
Experience rating:   Negatively related to the inverse of the amount of total (direct) losses by the
primary insurer in period t-1 (not interacted with the share of reinsured
losses)
Monitoring: Increasing in the signal m(a) which, without loss in generality, is negatively16 The firm had to have positive level of assets, policyholder surplus, net premiums, and total reinsurance ceded.
Both direct premiums earned and written had to exceed $5 million each year.  Direct premiums written had to exceed
net premiums written.  We also eliminate some special purpose insurers.  For example, insurance companies are
sometimes established (often as captives) as a tax shield on an ad-hoc basis for specific types of losses (e.g., a liability
ruling in which the judgment is known but the timing of payments is not yet decided).
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related to the action (i.e., m'(a) < 0).
III. Evidence of Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Contracts
This section presents evidence indicating the degree to which reinsurers use price incentives
and monitoring to try to limit moral hazard.  Since our estimation strategy is moderately constrained
by the available data, we first briefly describe the data before turning to our estimation strategy and
results.
The Data Set
We constructed a panel data set representing several hundred of the largest property-liability
insurers.  We have eight years of data for each insurer, from the years 1988 to 1995.  For the years
1993 to 1995, NAIC-PL (National Association of Insurance Commissioners — Property and
Liability) data are used.  For the years 1988 to 1992, Best data are used.  A large conversion table
was constructed to bridge the data sets to ensure consistency between variable definitions.  We
therefore impose some very minor restrictions on the data set in order to focus on established entities
where experience rating, monitoring and moral hazard are presumably the most relevant.
16  Our
resulting data set represents 462 firms, for a total number of 3,696 observations for 1988 - 1995.
Construction of Variables
Our data set has the familiar limitation in that it does not contain explicit contract
information.  As a result, we must infer relevant contract information from the data that is available.17 This ratio is commonly used in the efficiency literature and was probably first used by Geehan (1977).
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The Dependent Variable.  First, there is no easily available reinsurance price measure.
Premium income is a revenue measure, combining both the quantity of insurance sold with the price
per unit of coverage. To overcome this problem, we adopt the standard strategy of measuring the
contract price as the premium per dollar of expected losses incurred and assume that this is measured










Our model predicts that the ratio of premiums to expected losses will generally differ from
unity at a yearly frequency.  Without controls for moral hazard, the ratio should be unity in a
competitive / contestable market setting.  However, controls for moral hazard will generate variation
in the ratio, which, indeed, is part of our identification strategy taken below.  The premium is
disconnected from expected losses at a yearly frequency for two reasons.  First, the experience rating
price control requires previous losses to be penalized in future periods with higher premiums,
resulting in a higher contemporaneous premium / expected loss ratio.  Conversely, unusually low
losses are rewarded with a lower premium the next period, resulting in a lower contemporaneous
ratio.  Second, costly monitoring will increase the insurance premium and reduce the expected
losses, causing the ratio to rise.
  Experience and retrospective rating  Third, the reinsurance premium often includes an
initial premium paid at the beginning of the contract period and a retrospective premium that is paid
later.  But our data set only includes total reinsurance premiums paid in a given year, which cannot
be decomposed into these two parts.  As a result, we can only test for the response of year-to-year
premium prices to previous direct losses, i.e., experience rating.
Our model predicts that the reinsurer will “experience rate” the previous direct losses of the-15-
primary insurer.  Our model predicts a negative relationship within a contractual relationship
between a given reinsurer and a primary insurer.  Specifically, our model predicts a negative
















insurer to control for scale effects.  However, most of the variation in our panel data set is cross-
sectional, not longitudinal.  Between firms, we would expect a positive relationship between the
reinsurance premium price and the inverse of lagged direct losses.  The reason is that, even after
controlling for scale, primary insurers whose books of business tend to be more risky, would have
higher premium- to-loss ratios than firms with less risky books.  We do not have enough
observations per firm to include a dummy variable for each firm, as with a fixed-effects regression,
to allow us to isolate the “within” time-series estimator from the “between” cross-section estimator.
As a result, our OLS estimator will be a linear combination of the “within” (longitudinal) estimator
and the “between” (cross-sectional) estimator which are predicted to have opposite signs.  We,
therefore, make no prediction on the relationship between the insurance premium and lagged direct
losses. Instead we focus on the direct price control below.
Direct Price Control.  Recall that the model predicts that the responsiveness of premiums
to prior period losses increases as more reinsurance is purchased. This suggests that we use an
interactive explanatory variable, comprising the prior period reinsurance losses which we normalize
by direct premiums received by the primary insurer from its customers in the previous period,









118This normalization controls for cross-sectional scale differences between primary insurers that is inherent in
our data set but is not part of our model which focuses a single contractual relationship between a primary insurer and
a reinsurer. It turns out, however, that the qualitative results reported below are not affected by this normalization.
20Thus, abnormal losses realization can cause mischief if the reinsurance is non proportional. If there is a
deductible in the reinsurance then random realizations will automatically generate a negative coefficient for this variable
whereas an upper limit would generate a spurious positive coefficient.
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deductible.
18 Because, deductible levels, are unavailable, we measure the share of a primary insurer’s
total direct losses that are reinsured as reinsured losses per dollar of the primary insurer’s expected
direct losses,  , and assume this is measured with random error.



























































sensitivity of premium prices to past losses will increase as a greater proportion of the primary’s loss
today is reinsured.  Our model predicts that this relationship should be strong when reinsurance is
purchased from a reinsurer that is not part of the same financial group as the primary insurer (non-
affiliates) and less strong when both firms are affiliates. 
Monitoring.  Fourth, our data set does not include direct measures of monitoring.
Fortunately, this issue does not pose a serious problem if we assume that reinsurance premium prices
are competitively set.  Monitoring can be captured by the ratio of reinsured losses over total (direct)












to control for cross-sectional scale differences. However, this specification might cause a spurious
correlation because the current period’s reinsured losses appear in denominator of the dependent
variable and the numerator of the explanatory variable.
20 To avoid such problems we will use the
lagged ratio of reinsured to direct losses, thus using the model assumption there is some stability in21Notice that we also used a lagged ratio of reinsurance coverage in the interactive direct price variable. In so
doing ,we also avoided such problems of spurious correlation.
22 The monitoring term could pick up another effect if the primary insurer and reinsurer aren’t rational.  In
particular, if reinsurers do not anticipate that more reinsurance will lead to more losses, then we might find a negative
relationship between the premium price and the monitoring term.  Our empirical finding of a positive relationship among
affiliates, therefore, is not caused by this bias.
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the reinsurance relationship.
















are lower); less significant otherwise.
22
Regression Equation









































































firms assets (assets), net premiums earned (npe), the interest rate (relevant for investment income),
and a dummy variable indicating the organization type of the primary insurer (mutual and reciprocals
= 1; stock = 0).
To summarize, we make the following a priori predictions on the signs of the coefficients.
Barring perfect monitoring, the value of b should be negative for both non-affiliates and affiliates
but a stronger relationship should exist for non-affiliates where monitoring costs are higher.  The
value of c is ambiguous due to competing longitudinal and cross-sectional effects.  The value of d
should be positive but a stronger relationship should exist for affiliates where the cost of monitoring
is cheaper.23 Losses are aggregated and cannot be decomposed into losses reinsured by affiliates and non-affiliates.
24 Moreover, the direct price control coefficient estimated for non-affiliates is statistically different than the
direct price control coefficient estimated for non-affiliates.  This relationship also holds for the other lines of insurance.
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Results
Tables 1 - 3 report regression results for three of the largest lines with reinsurance:
homeowners, product and general liability, and total (all) lines of insurance.  For each insurance line,
separate regressions were run for reinsurance transactions between affiliates and between non-
affiliates.  Data restrictions prevented including those few insurers that reinsured their losses through
both affiliates and non-affiliates.
23   Tables 1a and 1b reports regression results for the homeowners
line of insurance for both affiliates and non-affiliates. As expected, in both  regressions for affiliates
and non affiliates, the cross sectional variation overwhelms any time series effects in the experience
rating variable and we look to the direct price control variable to detect the presence of price
incentives to offset moral hazard. For affiliates (Table 1a), the regression coefficient for the direct
























and quite large.  These results indicate that moral hazard exists in the reinsurance market with
affiliates and is controlled via price incentives and monitoring, but mostly by monitoring.  For non-
affiliates (Table 1b), the direct price control is negative and significant, and almost twice as large as
for affiliates.
24  The monitoring term, though, is not significantly different from zero.  These results
indicate that moral hazard exists in the non-affiliated reinsurance market and is controlled mainly
via price incentives with little or no use of monitoring. 
Tables 2a and 2b report regression results for the liability line of insurance while Tables 3a
and 3b report the results for total (all) lines of insurance.  For each pair of tables, the same pattern
shown in Tables 1a and 1b emerge: (1) moral hazard exists in the reinsurance market and (2) it is-19-
controlled between affiliates mainly with the use of monitoring whereas non-affiliates rely almost
exclusively on price incentives.
In sum, the evidence is supportive of the moral hazard model outlined earlier.  Since the cost
of monitoring is lower within affiliates, affiliated reinsurers most rely on this incentive mechanism.
Similarly, non-affiliated reinsurers rely almost exclusively on price incentives.  It is interesting to
note that not only is the regression coefficient for the monitoring term significant only for affiliates,
the point estimate is much larger than for non-affiliates.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a multi-period principle agent model of the reinsurance transaction
from which we derive predictions on the optimal contract design in the presence of moral hazard.
The contractual features include insurer risk retention, direct monitoring and loss sensitive
premiums.  The model predicts that price controls would be particularly strong when contracting
parties (principal and agent) are non-affiliated (i.e., not part of the same financial group) while
monitoring would be relatively more observable among affiliates.  We then use panel data on U.S.
property liability reinsurance to test the model. The empirical results are consistent with the main
predictions of the model.  In particular, we find evidence for the use of loss sensitive premiums when
the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates, but little or no use of monitoring.  In contrast, we find
evidence for the use of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates, where monitoring
costs are lower, but less use of price controls.-20-
Table 1a.   Test for Moral Hazard.  Homeowners Reinsurance: Affiliates




























































assets t 0.00 0.89
npe t 0.00 -0.78
interest rate t 0.85 3.48
*
organization type t -0.41 -0.56
* implies significance at the 5 percent level.-21-
Table 1b.   Test for Moral Hazard.  Homeowners Reinsurance : Non-Affiliates

























































assets t 0.00 -0.19
npe t 0.00 0.18
interest rate t -0.03 -0.07
organization type t -0.09 -0.08
* implies significance at the 5 percent level.-22-
Table 2a.   Test for Moral Hazard.  Product and General Liability: Affiliates




























































assets t 0.00 -1.49
npe t 0.00 0.91
interest rate t -0.15 -0.67
organization type t -0.60 -0.93
* implies significance at the 5 percent level.-23-
Table 2b.   Test for Moral Hazard.  Product and General Liability: Non-Affiliates



























































assets t 0.00 -1.00
npe t 0.00 0.95
interest rate t 0.36 1.05
organization type t -0.34 -0.33
* implies significance at the 5 percent level.-24-
Table 3a.   Test for Moral Hazard.  Total Lines: Affiliates

























































assets t 0.00 0.24
npe t 0.00 -0.60
interest rate t 0.15 0.82
organization type t -0.63 -1.14
* implies significance at the 5 percent level.-25-
Table 3b.   Test for Moral Hazard.  Total Lines: Non-Affiliates


























































assets t 0.00 3.05
*
npe t 0.00 -0.69
interest rate t 0.14 1.04
organization type t 0.27 0.66
* implies significance at the 5 percent level.-26-
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